Category Archives: Cladism

Discusses issues related to cladism´s stupid simplification of hierarchically branching processes

On a single understanding of the world

If there had been a single understanding of the world, then the world hadn’t been locked in eternal change, but had sooner or later reached that understanding. However, now that there isn’t, it neither don’t nor won’t.

The only other possibility is that the world instead is locked in a single understanding, and that change actually only occurs in our heads. But, if so, then time would not have been empirically relative to speed in space, ie, to the extent that clocks draw with increasing speed in space. We can’t fake empirical evidence.

So, there obviously isn’t a single understanding of the world, and thus neither any “Higgs particle” nor any “tree of life”. Instead, particle physicists and cladists appear to have misunderstood matters totally, actually up-side-down or inside-out (depending on whether we describe it in 2 or 3 dimensions).

Together with the facts that there isn’t any exit from conceptualization and that we can’t stop change, this fact means that our comprehension of the world (in for example politics) will circulate between its extremes forever. The only thing we can influence is what we practically do in every state, ie, the practical consequences of it. The circle is inevitable, but we can reduce the damage from it (and thus the need of truth commissions).



On Gods (as “Higgs particle” and “the tree of life”)

If the world is rationally understandable, then there must be a “Higgs particle” and a “true tree of life”. Unfortunately, there isn’t any “Higgs particle” or “true tree of life”, because they are contradictory.

Contradictory things, like Gods, may be believed in although they are contradictory, but not in a rational context, because they are irrational. The world thus obviously isn’t understandable.

On the search for the truth with words

When we search for the truth with words, we have to assume something in order to be able to deduce something logically. The problem with this fact is that it leaves the idea of “a truth” between the assumption(s) and the deduction.

Instead, this fact means that logic is a merry-go-round with two entrances: one assuming something and deducing something, and the other assuming what the former deduced and deducing what it assumed – the two thus circling around the idea of “a truth”. This is obvious in discrete metalogic, that is, logic of the first order, or logic with numbers, where “single” is ambiguous (or contradictory, depending on aspect) between none and all.

In summary: logic is useful (together with math) to handle life in a practical sense, but it (ie, science) can never rise above this level. It can just produce models of the world that are better or worse, never reach a truth. Such reach is just as impossible as that probability would reach 1.

So, don’t believe particle phycisists, they have not found “Higgs particle”, and understand that cladists’ search for “the true tree of life” is just as vain as particle physicists’ search for “Higgs particle” is. Such things (ie, “Higgs particle” and “the tree of life”) are actually running points of rationality, that is, manifestations of the impossible illusion that rationality is searching, ie, manifestations of the rational God. And, this (“rational”) God is just as irrational as all other Gods are.

On the pivotal point

Biological systematics is very interesting in that it searches for an all encompassing classification (as also particle physics do), ie, including ALL classes of ONE class (for biological systematics “living beings” and for particle physics “particles”). The interesting aspect in endeavors like these is whether the search is sensible or not, since we humans do not agree on whether classes are real or not (ie, whether there is a consistent all encompassing classification to be found or not) in the first place. In this aspect, biological systematics is particularly interesting by having developed two classifications differing only in assuming that classes are real or not (ie, that there is a consistent all encompassing classification to be found or not): cladistics and Linnean systematics, respectively. Cladistics thus assumes that there is an all encompassing classification to be found, whereas Linnean classification assumes that there isn’t (Linnean classification handling its assumption by instead using an orthogonal system of classification).

By this, biological systematics can lead us to an answer of the ancient question of whether classes are real or not. In this light (ie, in the light of the two orthogonal classifications “cladistics” and “Linnean classification”), the assumption that classes are real (ie, cladistics) can only be proved by showing that the assumption that they aren’t real (ie, Linnean classification) is inconsistent. One of them has to be inconsistent, since they are contradictory, and the burden of proof thus lies on the cladistic side, ie, proving that the assumption that classes aren’t real is inconsistent, because an orthogonal system (like the Linnean system of classification) is consistent per definition. An orthogonal system can’t meet contradictions per definition. Proving that an orthogonal system is consistent is thus insensible, because it is consistent per definition.

So, the two orthogonal classifications “cladistics” and “Linnean classification” in biological classification can thus lead us to the conclusion that the assumption that classes are real (eg, cladistics and particle physics) is inconsistent, whereas the assumption that they aren’t real (eg, Linnean systematics) is consistent. It means that classifications resting on the assumption that classes are real (like cladistics and particle physics) ends in paradox (ie, double contradiction). Biological systematics calls this paradox “the tree of life” and particle physics calls it “the Higgs particle”, none of which thus can be real.

Can we understand what reality is?

We can model reality, but we can’t understand what it is. The problem is that “what it is” has two aspects depending on whether we assume that classes aren’t real or that they are real, traditionally called nominalism and realism, respectively.

Nominalism (ie, assuming that classes aren’t real) leads to the conclusion that reality is ambiguous, whereas realism (ie, assuming that classes are real) leads to a pointer. The former can be interpreted simply as that everything has at least two aspects, but how can the latter be interpreted?

Well, digging deeper in this matter, we can understand that a pointer also has two aspects: the pointer itself and what it points at. So, how can this fact be interpreted? A hint to the solution is that these aspects are the same aspects as an error has: it is an error and it points at a possible solution. This comparison leads us to the interpretation of the pointer as an error, or, now climbing up from the hole, that realism leads to error. It means that we can interpret realism (ie, assuming that classes are real) as leading to error. (Examples of this error are, by the way, what cladists call “the tree of life” and what particle physics calls “Higgs particle”, none of which thus can be found.)

In summary,  we can’t understand what reality is, because none of the alternative ways to such understanding that are given can lead to understanding, sorry to say. We thus have to conclude that we, unfortunately, simply can’t understand what reality is. (Instead, I would like to cite the Buddhist saying: give up, give up, give up.)

On taking the step from Linnean systematics to cladistics

The difference between the Linnean systematics and cladistics is just whether one assumes that kinds are not real (Linnean systematics) or real (cladistics). The question whether living beings have originated by evolution or not is thus irrelevant for the choice between them.

The problem that gives rise to this choice is that we simply can’t decide whether kinds are real or not, and that whereas assuming that they aren’t real leads to ambiguity, assuming that they are real instead leads to paradoxical contradiction.

Taking the step from Linnean systematics to cladistics does thus mean taking the step from consistency to inconsistency.  It does not mean accepting the theory of evolution, but just accepting inconsistency. On the contrary, accepting the theory of evolution must, in a rational approach, mean accepting an orthogonal classification, like the Linnean systematics. The difference between Linnean systematics and cladistics does not reside in accepting the theory of evolution or not, but in accepting inconsistency (cladistics) or not (Linnean systematics).

The fact that cladistics is inconsistent (actually paradoxically contradictory) means that it can’t find a consistent solution.

Cladistics – the vain search to define the indefinable

The biological discipline called “cladistics” is not hypotetico-deductive but inductive (ie, a faith rather than a science and therefore more correctly called “cladism). It means that it is  inconsistent, actually paradoxically self-contradictory (see Russell’s paradox). The fundamental component that makes it inductive is assuming that kinds are real, ie, can be found.

This fact means that the discipline in practice is “a vain search to define the indefinable”, as Charles Darwin expressed it. It’s end point is actually a paradox.