When discussing reality, we address real phenomena with words (i.e., concepts). How we address real phenomena with words is called conceptualization. The early history of our conceptualization took place in the ancient parts of what is today known as Greece.
First, a guy named Parmenides assumed that kinds exist, and concluded that it means that change does not exist. He adherred to this conclusion so strong that he died convinced that the world is “frozen”, that change only exists in our heads.
After him, a guy named Heracleitos claimed that it is the other way around, that is, that only change exits. He claimed that things are in a constant state of change, that they only appear to stay the same like a light of a candle appears to stay the same.
Later, Aristotle synthesized their approaches claiming that we have to approach the single thing from several dimensions simultaneously. He instead partioned the single thing (conceptually, not practically) into one generic thing over time, consisting of two specific consecutive things in time; the generic thing being the similarity wherein the specific things are different. His synthesis thus consists of three components: a generic, two specifics and a specific difference (in a generic similarity). This laid the basis for science as we know it. Aristotle also created the notion of genera and species in biology, by partitioning biological organisms into genera and species.
About 2000 years later, Linné found out how Aristotle’s synthesis should be arranged hierarchically. This arrangement became known as the Linnean classification.
The Linnean classification led Darwin to the idea that all biological organisms have originated from a common ancestor according to this classification, that is, by dichotomous splitting of biological species. The (scientific) problem with this idea is that it appears to confuse Aristotle’s consistent synthesis into both Parmenides’ and Heracleitos’ comprehensions at the same time, although they are incompatible. The simple solution of this problem is, however, to comprehend the internal lines of the illustration as two things in a row. It turns Darwin’s theory into a consistent process model.
However, this solution was never adopted, but instead a guy named Hennig claimed that a confusion of Parmenides’ and Heracleitos’ incompatible comprehensions is “natural”. He must have been so tired of searching the solution of the problem that he simply accepted the confusion.
Hennig’s confusion is, however, extremely difficult to straighten out, although it is so obviously inconsistent. The reason is that it in practice is the same approach that Parmenides argued for, even died for, that is, that change is an illusion, because it is consistent on its assumption, that is, that kinds exist. It thus cannot be falsified on consistency arguments alone. It is just as true as both Heracleitos’ contrary approach and Aristotle’s synthesis, judged by consistency arguments alone.
How on earth shall we then choose between these exclusive approaches? Well, the answer is by comparison with facts. The reason is that both Parmenides’ and Heracleitos’ approaches confuses conceptualization with reality, whereas Aristotle’s conceptualization doesn’t. It means that if there is a single fact that supports that there is a difference between concepts and reality, then this fact will falsify both Parmenides’ and Heracleitos’ approaches. And, luckily there is one: the relativity of time. Both Parmenides’ and Heracleitos’ comprehensions do also confuse space and time, and this confusion is falsified by the relativity of time. It means that the relativity of time also falsifies Hennig’s confusion. Left are the winners: Aristotle’s synthesis and Linné’s classification, that is, the foundation for science.
The relation between Linné’s (empirically) correct classification on the one hand and Parmenides’ and Heracleitos’ comprehensions, that is, Hennig’s comprehension on the other is that they are mirror images of each other. There is no common ground in them. However, the relativity of time tells us that it means that Hennig’s comprehension, that is, cladism is totally wrong, whereas Aristotle’s and Linné’s comprehension, that is, science is totally right.
In summary, it means that Hennig and his disciples obviously don’t understand conceptualization, and that they thereby are wrong.
d thus what we can say about reality, and I have recently shown that cladism is the mirror image