On classification

Classification is ultimately not about reality (except for the class “objects”), but of slicing reality into similar pieces.

Cladistics (i.e., slicing hierarchical illustrations of dichotomously branching processes into the pieces “clades”) is nothing but slicing of one’s own, temporary comprehension of reality instead of reality, that is, a classification of a subjective comprehension (like classifying idiots into total and partly idiots). The problem with it is that there is no unambiguous slicing to be found (neither of reality nor of our comprehension of it) per definition, and that it is both theoretically and practically insensible (actually falsified by facts).

The Linnean systematics does instead systematize the classification, thereby avoiding internal contradictions (i.e., inconsistencies). The fact that there is no unambiguous slicing to be found (neither of reality nor of our comprehension of it) per definition is, of course, insolvable (as a fact). One can’t do magics with one’s knees (as we say in Sweden).

On Malte Ebach’s blog post “Systematics and Biogeography: Cladistics and Vicariance”

On Malte Ebach’s blog post “Systematics and Biogeography: Cladistics and Vicariance ” , he starts off by saying that:

“Every now and then a scientific discipline undergoes a revolution, an episode that changes the way a subject is perceived, the way it is understood and undertaken – a new vision emerges that prevents a return to the subject matter as it was before, a paradigm change, some genuine progress”.

In concentrate (i.e., excluding the bull), it says that;

“a scientific discipline [may] undergo a revolution, a[n old] vision [re]emerges that prevents a return to the subject matter as it was [in between]. In the last century, there [has been] a revolution in phylogenetics and systematics that began with the [confusion] of Willi Hennig (1950, 1966) and its interpretation by Lars Brundin (1966)”. 

And shorter that:

“In the last [50 years] there [has been] a revolution in [biological systematics from Darwin to Parmenides] that began with the [confusion] of Willi Hennig (1950, 1966) and its interpretation by Lars Brundin (1966)”.

He goes on saying that there was a need for this revolution citing Colin Patterson that “By about 1960 palaeontology had achieved such a hold on phylogeny reconstruction that there was a commonplace belief that if a group had no fossil record its phylogeny was totally unknown and unknowable” (Patterson 1987:8), just as if science’s need of facts requires a revolution to a prescientific stage not giving a shit about facts for a science that can’t come up with facts.

Malte then states the truth that the “‘’commonplace belief’ was eventually rejected in favour of determining relationship from evidence (characters, homologies) provided by organisms (living or extinct), a shift from the preoccupation of discovering ancestry directly from the fossil record to determining common ancestry”, where ‘commonplace belief’ refers to science’s requirement of empirical evidence. Malte thus turns science’s requirement of empirical evidence (i.e., facts) into a “belief”.

After this overturn of empirical science (i.e., objectivity) into cladistics (i.e., subjectivity), Malte continues  with that ““little by little palaeontologists have perceived that Hennig’s principles of phylogenetic systematics meant a revolution to their science”, meaning that “Hennig’s principles” actually acknowledge their subjective comprehensions, while denying empirical science, thus liberating them from the requirement to substantiate their beliefs with facts. It actually opens for everyone to cultivate their own belief. 

Then, Malte pushes buying and reading Systematics and Biogeography: Cladistics and Vicariance by Gary Nelson and Norman Platnick (Columbia University Press, New York, 1981) claiming that it “might be understood as a reaction to phylogeny reconstruction, or more specifically, Haeckel’s paleontological version of it, developed by Matthews and Simpson”, just as if phylogeny reconstruction (or Haeckel’s paleontological version of it, whatever it is, developed by Matthews and Simpson) is wrong.

Finally, Malte summarizes the post by that “Classification (and phylogeny, and systematics) are all best referred to as relationship-thinking, of which Systematics and Biogeography is a meditation on”, expressing his confusion of  classification, phylogeny and systematics in “relationship-thinking”.

The question to “relationship thinking” is: relation between what? Can Malte answer this simple question? Between biological species? If so, how do cladistics traverse the difference between the relationship between mitochondrial DNA, between species and between genera?Isn’t its focus on relationship ambiguous per definition?  The cladistic”relationship thinking does thus lack both sense and coherence. It is just a way of making money.