The fascinating property of reality is that when we partition it into particles and waves, and try to narrow in on the exact position of a particle, then the particle vanishes into a wave, whereas when we try to narrow in on the exact meaning of a “wave”, waves instead vanish into particles. There is obviously a breaking point where particles turn into waves as they get smaller, and waves turn into particles as they get smaller.
So, what does this say about reality? Well, fundamentally that reality is cheating us. So, how shall we handle this cheat? Well, we just have two options: to assume either that a particle and a wave is BOTH a particle and a wave, or that a particle is NEITHER a particle NOR a wave. Of these, the former seems to be the least crazy option, since nothing can be nothing, but the latter is actually the only consistent option. So, holding on to consistency, we have to assume the apparently most crazy option, that is, that a particle is not a wave and that a wave is not a particle, which, expressed in this way, surprisingly appears sensible. A particle is of course not a wave, and a wave is of course not a particle. Holding on to to consistency thus leads us from our action, ie, partitioning reality into particles and waves, into the conclusion that reality consists of particles and waves. Reality does thus lurk between our partitioning and our conclusion.
If there had been a single truth, then time would not have been relative to speed in space.
Now that time is relative to speed in space, we have to accept that there isn’t a single truth.
It means that there is neither “a true tree of life” nor “a Higgs particle”.
The problem with reality is that it just have a front side and a back side, and nothing in between.
If we want to divide all things of a particular kind, like “particles”, “species” or “butterflies”, into several subkinds, then there are two different (actually orthogonal) methods to achieve this goal. One is to partition the whole group into subkinds, then partition each of these kinds into subkinds, then partition each of these kinds into subkinds, and so on. The other is to join similar things of the kind into kinds, join these kinds into superkinds, join these classes into superkinds, and so on. The former thus starts with the kind itself and ends with all possible subkinds, whereas the latter starts with all things of the kind and ends with the kind itself.
Now, the fact that the former method doesn’t end with the things of the kind themselves, but with all possible subkinds of the kind, means that the two methods can’t reach the same division, since the number of partitions in them differ by one. The two methods are simply incompatible, actually orthogonally contradictory.
This fact did Carl von Linné understand, either consciously or unconsciously, and found out that the only way to to join these orthogonal methods consistently is to first partition the kind into two nested sets of kinds, one generic and one specific, whereafter the generic sets can be consistently joined into superkinds. Linné did thus find a solution of the inherent inconsistency of classification.
What this problem and solution tells us is that no question has an unambiguous answer, because in order to find the answer we have to classify, and classification is inherently either inconsistent or ambiguous.
The notion of a “Higgs particle” in the context of “particles” can be likened to a notion of an “Envall principle” in the context of “principles”.
The idea is that the eternal division of particles can be handled rationally by assuming that there is a kind of particle that temporarily emerges from a field (ie, the “Higgs particle”). In this setting, particles are fundamentally a process wherein “Higgs particles” continuously arise from a field. Exactly what a “Higgs particle” is, ie, a “field” or a “particle”, is uncertain.
This idea can be likened to that the eternal division of principles could be handled rationally by assuming that there is a kind of principle that temporarily emerges from a field. In this setting, principles are fundamentally a process wherein “Envall principles” continuously arise from a field. Exactly what an “Envall principle” is, ie, a “field” or a “principle”, is uncertain. However, sure is that if it is a “field”, then it’s not a principle, and if it’s a principle, then it’s not a field.
Nothing can be both something and nothing at the same time, even if it would solve our problem to understand the world, because if it could, then time would not be empirically relative to speed in space.
Everything has two orthogonal aspects, including reality.
If both of these aspects are correct, then there can’t be anything between them, because if there is, then reality is contradictory.
There thus isn’t anything between the two orthogonal aspects on reality. Reality is nothing but an illusion. (But, we can understand how this illusion behaves.) Continue reading
The problem with principles is that every principle is composed of several objectives, whereof some sooner or later (ie, ultimately) will arrive to a contradiction between them (called contradiction of objectives). It means that principles actually are sloping plans towards a swap between principles. No principle can survive the destiny of being substituted by another principle.
Now, if the number of principles is finite, which it must be if the claim above is correct (ie, that all of them arrive to some contradiction between its objectives), then the route of embracing principles is actually an eternal merry-go-round between all principles. This merry-go-round may moreover be regulated by a natural law, ie, governing the change of society. It may thus have the power of both explaining history and predicting future for the human society.
Until this route of embracing principles is clarified, I can just cite Groucho Marx in that “Those are my principles, but if you don’t like them…well, I have others”.