On the fact “Russell’s paradox” and its implications for biological systematics and particle physics

Biological systematics illustrates the difference between realism (ie, assuming that kinds are real) and nominalism (ie, consistency) by its two orthogonal systems of classification called “cladistics” and “Linnean systematics”.  The difference between them is namely just that cladistic classification rests on the assumption that kinds are real, whereas Linnean systematics rests on consistency, since the assumption that kinds are real is inconsistent (as demonstrated by Russell’s paradox). The difference between realism (ie, cladistics) and nominalism (ie, Linnean systematics) is thus just that the former assumes that inconsistency is consistent, whereas the latter is consistent.

This fact is devastating for any aim to make biological systematics scientific, since it means that there is no true classification to be found, but that a search for such a thing instead is indefinite (as also Charles Darwin concluded). Instead, any aim to make biological systematics scientific is bound to end in race biology, because this is the end for realism in biological systematics.

The fact is also devastating for particle physics, since it means that there is no “standard model” to be found, but that a search for such a thing instead is indefinite. Instead, it will end in that it “think it has got” the paradox itself, which it calls “Higgs particle”.  Never will it pass the aisle between “think” it has got and “has got”, because it is actually the aisle between “believe” and “know”.

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