In order to discuss something, we have to assume something. It means that there are always two entrances to every problem, ie, two approaches – one to assume that things (ie, objects) are real and another to assume that classes are real. The former is thus called objectivity or nominalism, whereas the latter is called subjectivity or class realism.

These two entrances are orthogonal, ie, diametrically opposed, meaning that they exclude each other. They thus don’t just contradict each other, but moreover don’t even share any common ground. It means that proponents for the two approaches simply think that proponents of the other approach is totally stupid.

Both approaches can reason logically on the basis of their respective fundamental assumption (ie, axiom), but the difference between them is that objectivity is consistent, ie, without contradictions, whereas subjectivity is inconsistent, ie, ending in paradox, as Russell’s paradox (published in 1901) revealed.

This fact means that the longest we can reach with a discussion is to be consistent, and that consistency inevitably leads us into some orthogonal carousel around an interface middle, wherein one extreme attaches to another extreme. The only alternative is to end in paradox, as cladistics and particle physics do, which, of course, can’t be real. (If it had been real, then everything would have been possible, eg, I could have eaten a cake and kept it at the same time, and there would not have been any “natural laws”.)

This orthogonal carousel has mathematics already found by its axiomatic set theory. It means that it can deduct the whole of mathematics from logic. This (ie, mathematics) is thus the longest we can reach with a discussion about something, that is, to a consistent system for such discussions. We can thus find out how we must discuss something, but neither any particular nor any general solution of any particular discussion.

The target of discussions thus eludes us by that the two entrances to discussion excludes a target, instead only offering us a scheme for a consistent discussion, which sends us to an interface which bounces us back into discussion from an extreme into another extreme. Discussion is thus endless by returning into itself in all directions, except the inconsistent exits into paradoxes, like “the true tree of life” of cladistics and “Higgs particle” of particle physics.

Discussion can thus never lead us to a true description of anything, except a true description how we must discuss something. Words can’t reach deeper than to an understanding of how they can be used. The mystery of what something “really is” is thus beyond our reach.