There is a front and a back of everything, including reality and conceptualization. The front is consistently described by propositional logic and the back by first order logic. Together, the front and back side thus make up consistent systems, like reality and conceptualization. The relation between every two such systems is ambiguous, because it is the only possibility that all of them can be consistent and no two systems are the same.
We can comprehend all such systems as “things”, because they have the same integrity as the things we traditionally call “things”, and they can also be nested in each other (also just fully, not partly). Every such thing is thus like an interface that opens up within another interface. This comprehension thus paints the picture of things as interfaces, whereof there is no difference between things like you and me, and things like reality and conceptualization. “Things” simply transcend the difference between us and reality that science traditionally draws. In this complete picture, science is thus inconsistent by distinguishing things like you and me from things like what we call reality and our conceptualization of this reality. In the more complete picture, what we call reality is just a thing that includes us, and conceptualization is just a thing in this reality.
With conceptualization, we can thus consistently understand being as a set of interfaces. We can moreover conclude that this set is not finite, because a set is single only by being several, and that it is not countably infinite, because it does not have a one-to-one correspondence to any other set, and that it thus must be uncountable infinite (like the real numbers). The understanding thus paints a picture of being as a 2-dimensional uncountably set of interfaces (whereof you and me are parts).
This understanding is difficult to portray from our point of view, The point of view is instead way above our heads. It does, however, explain why realism, like cladistics and particle physics, leads into paradoxical contradiction by that it conflates different consistent systems, ie, different interfaces, or “things”, in this case reality and conceptualization, which actually has an ambiguous relation. The conflation thus leas into a paradoxical contradiction.
Instead keeping different consistent systems (ie, things) apart thus leads to the understanding that we’re parts of a reality part, whereof conceptualization also is a part, and that we’re moreover parts of the conceptualization part. This system looks very much like the Linnean system of classification, and it is indeed principally the same kind of system. Carl von Linné thus understood this relation between consistent systems already about 300 years ago, just like Heraclitus did about 2500 years ago.
Understanding is thus not continuously upward, but rather up and down, where we hope that the long term trend is upward. This hope appears, however, vain, since realism (like cladistics and particle physics) is still not rejected. We’ll take a large step upwards when we reject it.