Nominalism and realism are just two aspects of conceptualization. They meet in Russell’s paradox, which thus is the conceptual representation (ie, abstraction) of the real things that conceptualization begins with. This abstraction is a paradox simply because two aspects can’t be one thing.
The realist idea that this abstraction not only can be one thing, but moreover can be found (eg, cladistics), and even may already have been found (particle physics) is thus just a brain ghost. Instead, the abstraction is actually the same kind of thing for rationalists as Gods are for religionalists (ie, religious people), that is, the rational God.
This may be the reason why cladistics’ search for “the true tree of life” and particle physics’ search for “Higgs particle” haven’t been as unambiguously discarded as delusions by many other scientists than they have been by me. Instead, many other scientists appear to reason that: yes, they are indeed delusions, but they are our delusions, as if Gods are OK if they are rational.
This rational approach is, however, actually devastating for rationality, by transferring the battle between faith and rationality from rationality’s half of the field to faith’s half of the field, because on that half of the field rationality is bound to lose. As a God, Russell’s paradox can’t compete with religious Gods.
So, I suggest that science retreats from its claim to being able to explain reality, instead admitting that it is merely a practical method to handle reality. It can’t “explain” reality or “reconstruct” history, because in its approach, reality is ambiguous and history is paradoxical. It can thus make good models of how reality works, but can’t “explain” reality or “reconstruct” history. I suggest that science admits its boundaries, leaving the rest to self-contradictory belief. Only by this can it lay claim on a certain area of discussion, that is, the consistent part of it.