We conceptualize reality in terms of “things” and “events” (which the things participate in). It means that there must be a difference between “things” and “events”, because otherwise “events” collapse into “things” and thus are impossible (which the ancient Greek Parmenides also claimed they are).
Whether this “otherwise” means that process is impossible (as Parmenides claimed and cladistics claims) or that it simply conflates the concept “event” with the concept “thing” is impossible to decide.
However, the definitional difference between “things” and “events” is that an event can be a thing, whereas a thing can’t be an event. This difference is not an existential difference, ie, not that there actually are “things” and “events” out there, but just that we have to keep these concepts apart, because one has to be prior to the other, since simultaneity is impossible both in reality and in words.
This fact, ie, that simultaneity is impossible, does thus mean that there are two possible fundamental approaches: one assuming that “events” equal “things” (called realism) and another keeping “things” and “events” apart (called nominalism). The former is thus indecisive as to whether it means that process is impossible or that it simply conflates the concept “event” with the concept “thing”, whereas the latter is consistent. The former is also the basis for “scientific race biology”, whereas the latter is the basis for today’s fusion of logic with mathematics.
The fundamental question we all have to answer is thus whether we acknowledge a difference between “things” and “events” or not. If not (like cladistics and particle physics), then we actually either deny conceptualization itself or are consistently inconsistent. If yes, then we’re on the track of modern mathematics.