Menvall’s Blog: change on different levels

On truth (and cladistics, or cladism)

October 30, 2009 · Leave a Comment

Truth is a relative conclusion.

This statement does not mean, however, that any relative conclusion is a truth (like cladists believe), but that truths have to be sought by relativity. Only one truth can be true at any particular point in time for the concept truth to be unambiguous, and thus true.  Cladists believe (actually define) that truth is ambiguous, at the same time as denying that it is. They are torn between their belief (in natural groups) and rationality (denying natural groups), which they solve by denying rationality, thereby also denying the foundation for their belief. Not even a definition that natural groups exist can thus make them exist. Natural groups are just as impossible today as they have always been (doomed as they are to the realm of abstraction), The only difference today is that humanity (and with it, biological systematics) is decaying into ignorance and stupidity.

Malte Ebach is, as far as I can see, the most shining example of this decay (next to Steve Farris). He appears to lack all signs of sense. He can thus be put as the contrary of Einstein. He’s on a mission to disprove the fact that time is relative. Good luck, Malte!

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Cladistics (cladism) – do classes exist?

October 30, 2009 · Leave a Comment

Cladistics (cladism), that is, discussing reality in terms of clades, rests on the assumption that classes exist (as I have explained in the scientific literature).

Cladists sense that this assumption is inconsistent, i.e., that not all classes can exist at the same time, but believe that they can avoid this inconsistency by “denying” some classes, not distinguishing natural classes from artificial classes. By natural classes, I mean classes that are distinguished by inherited similarities, usually called homologies, like reptiles and fishes. By artificial classes, I mean classes that are distinguished by non-inherited similarities, usually called analogies, like bats together with birds. Cladists’ belief (that they can avoid the inconsistency in assuming that classes exist by “denying” some classes, not distinguishing natural classes from artificial classes), is, however, wrong if the phylogeny is not totally symmetrical. If the phylogeny is the least bit asymmetrical, then some natural class that is not a holophyletic group (cladists actual notion of clade) has to be acknowledged to make possible a finding of a set of classes that can exist at the same time. Denial of this fact is the route into what Darwin called “a vain search to define the indefinable”. The expression that “not all classes can exist at the same time” does in a phylogenetic sense mean “not all natural and artificial classes can exist at the same time”. All natural classes not only can, but do exist at the same time. Cladistics’ (cladism’s) denial of paraphyletic groups is the route into what Darwin called “a vain search to define the indefinable” if phylogeny is asymmetrical.

The question of adopting cladistics (cladism) or not is thus a question of whether one believes that phylogeny is totally symmetrical or not. If one does, then one should adopt it, but if one does not, then one should not adopt it.

All natural classes do, of course, exist, like vertebrates, fishes and reptiles.

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On the battle between simplicity (i.e., cladistics, or cladism) and science

October 29, 2009 · Leave a Comment

There are two aspects on objects: an object in time is both a pattern and on its way between two patterns, that is, a process. These two aspects mean that we have to distinguish them in order to enter a route of logical (that is, consistent) reasoning that agrees with facts. The only valid argument against this argument is that matters are the other way around, that is, that there is only one aspect, and that objects thus do not exist (since it would mean that there are objects possessing incompatible properties). There is no neutral point between these two fundamentally different arguments.

The fact that time is relative does, however, mean that objects exist, since this fact is due to their relative relation to space. The contrary assumption, that there is only one aspect, does, on the contrary, mean that time cannot be relative, since time can only be time in one aspect. There is no room for time to be relative in this approach. This does not mean that the argument that there is only one aspect falsifies the fact that time is relative, but that the fact that time is relative falsifies the argument that there is only one aspect.

Cladism changes an acceptance of the first of these arguments to an acceptance of the second by first accepting the first and then accepting the second, solving the fact that it leads into a self-contradiction by denying the first, thus accepting the second. It thus actually simply acknowledges the second argument (i.e., that there is only one aspect, and thus no objects), although it does so along a tricky road from the first to the second including a primary confusion of the arguments and a secondary denial of the first. Acceptance of the second is dressed in the clothes of a logical reasoning from the first to the second by ”accepting” the first. The error in this route lies in that the first argument (i.e., that objects exist and that there are two aspects on objects) does not, and cannot lead to the second (i.e., that there is only one aspect). This jump over an impassable barrier is made by a neck-breaking confusion of them, wherein the impossible is turned into a fact and facts are turned into impossibilities. Out of the smoke arises an aproach that not only acknowledges the argument that there is only one aspect, but moreover does so by by having been born out of the first (i.e., the incompatible approach that objects exist and that there are two aspects on objects). It thus views itself as a “natural” approach having originated from an old typology analogous to how new species arise from old ones. Everything fits.

The only problem with cladism is the same as with its predecessor, or its generic, called realism, that is, that it is falsified by facts. It has like a turkey tried to take off from the ground since the origin of thought, which is just as impossible today as it was 3.000, 6,000 or 20,000 years ago. The only empirically consistent approach is that objects exist. Cladistics (cladism) does indeed hold the power in biological systematics today, but it is doomed to split forever by its internal inconsistency (i.e., self-contradiction). The question is not if, but how it will decay. I can only say that I haven’t seen such a stupidity in whole my life. Its leader is Steve Farris, which ought to say everything about the approach. He writes computer programs that bluntly optimizes optimization so that their results is incomprehensible for scientists. Explanation resides in that empirical shotcuts in optimization are available for a mind that does not care about empirical consistency. Leaving sense out opens for shortcuts.

Simplicitly (i.e., cladistics, or cladism) does thus open many doors that are closed within a consistent and empirically correct approach (i.e., science), but these passes are of no use, since they acknowledge the assumption that there is only one aspect on reality, which is wrong per definition.

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Cladism and science – the battle between optimization and falsification

October 27, 2009 · Leave a Comment

Scientists look at reality and partition it into handy categories for a question in focus. Cladists look at scientists’ partitioning of reality aiming to find a partitioning of reality that is “correct” (i.e., unambiguous, or what they call “natural”). Scientists use their categories to falsify answers to the question in focus that is less true than other answers, whereas cladists use categories to discern the “correct” (i.e.. unambiguous, or “natural”) partitioning, or, in this aspect, rather ordering, by optimization.     

The fact that kind is orthogonal to object does, however, mean that cladists aim is vain. There simply is no such thing or kind of thing to be found.

Cladists’ method to accomplish their aim is to define concepts by conjunction (like the Iliad, as Aristotle said) meaning that they define a concept (X) by equalizing it with another concept (Y).  Since this is the opposite to science’s method to define concepts by discussing a single object, it means that cladists follow scientists like a mirroring shadow, consistently trying to confuse the concepts scientists discern.

With the concept clade, cladists finally found the concept that confuses all concepts and which, thus, could give a name to their vain search. That’s why they founded a society for the guy that found it: Willi Hennig. Now, they’re lost in their up-side-down world that science prevented them from imposing on the public as long as they only mirrored science. In this world, single concepts have opposite meanings at the same time, meaning that noone understands what another one means. Different person’s only common denominator is the inconsistent (i.e., self-contradictory) concept clade. Cladists have finally prized optimization to a victory in biological systematics, only to find that it equals subjectivity, and thus plurality. The only difference between cladism and science is that cladism assumes that subjectivity is one, whereas science assumes that objectivity is one. Guess who’s right,

Cladism has thus prized objectivity the revolution around back to the subjectivity it started from, this time under the optimistic, but false impression that subjectivity is one. Cladists thus have to be woken up from their awkward position realizing that their victory was a Pyrrhus victory, actually denying what they fought for. 

What is left for cladists (except the power in biological systematics)?

(The answer is the same as the answer on “What’s up?”, that is, “Nothin’ much”).

→ Leave a CommentCategories: Biological systematics (generic) · Cladism

Truth is a relative conclusion

October 25, 2009 · Leave a Comment

Truth is a relative conclusion. It s a matter of distinguishing which of different conclusions that is more true than alternative conclusions are. It is a matter of distinguishing different nuances of gray from each other, rather than distinguishing white from black .

This distinction requires a criterion. Science’s criterion is agreement with facts, whereas cladism’s criterion is maximum parsimony. The problem with cladism’s criterion (maximum parsimony) is that there is not a single maximally parsimonious solution to be found, but only several different maximally parsimonious solutions for several different possible classifications of reality. It means that cladism can be analogized with a ship that’s steered towards a point that’s generically defined by how the captain defines what he sees, and which is specifically ambiguous. The journey can thus not be distinguished from eternal drifting. There is a thought behind every change of course, but the journey cannot be distinguished from randomness, and the fact that the goal is ambiguous means that it is eternal. It is actually what Darwin warned for calling it “a vain search to define the indefinable”.

Leaving facts as a decisive criterion, like Hennig did, means leaving an approach that closes up on reality asymptotically (i.e., science) for an eternal drift on the ocean of subjectivity. Hennig’s denial of facts does, of course, not change facts, but only twists the minds of those that follow him into his approach where truth is an absolute conclusion, which, in fact, is impossible per definition, and where the truth is erroneously believed to be reachable by maximum parsimony. The approach is a religion whose prophet is maximum parsimony: it believes that the truth can only be reached via maximum parsimony (analogous to Jesus), when there actually is nothing to be found in the religion (i.e., no God).  The approach (i.e., religion) is empty. Leaving facts as a decisive criterion is thus not a good idea.

The only alternative to Hennig’s approach (i.e., cladism) is science. Unfortunately, this alternative means that truth is relative and that it can thus only be reached asymptotically. It leaves us with the choice between pest and cholera (i.e., an eternal drift or a relative truth). This choice is, however, just a matter of fact. There’s nothing we can do to change the options, but can only make the choice. And, whereas science agrees with all known facts, Hennig’s approach (i.e., cladism) does not agree with the fact that time is relative (to space). It means that Hennig’s approach’s (i.e., cladism’s) prophet (i.e., maximum parsimony) is a wolf in a sheep’s clothes. It actually has nothing to offer but confusion. It is a puerta to mental desease.

Science requires acknowledgement of the axiom that objects exist, meaning that truth is a relative conclusion. 

(In an American metaphore, the matter can be exemplified by that George W Bush is wrong, whereas Barack Obama is right. It does, however, not mean that Barack Obama either can or will solve the problems America faces, but only that he’s principally right, whereas G W Bush is principally wrong. Solving practical problems do not necessarily depend on whether one is right or wrong, but on lots of circumstances. The problem with cladism is analogous to if G W Bush would claim that he’s principally right, i.e., that Christianity is right and Islam wrong, and thus that Barack Obama’s foundation that they are equally right (or wrong) is wrong, because it would put beliefs against each other instead of beliefs against science. The question is not which belief that is correct, but whether belief or science (i.e., discarding instead of believing) is correct. Barack Obama is simply more scientific (probably due to his good education) than believing. This annoys a great part of the American public, probably due to their bad education), but is none the less empirically correct. Barack Obama cannot abandon this approach for all “smör i Småland” (oil in Texas) , because it would invalidate his education and acknowledge belief instead of science. Barack Obama acknowledges that truth is a relative conclusion).

The fact that truth is a relative conclusion is undeniable. Cladism claims the contrary, i.e., that thruth is an absolute conclusion, but this claim is thus both inconsistent and empirically wrong. The defining boundary in discussions about reality goes between object and class, because it distinguishes the concrete (i.e., reality) from the abstract (i.e., concepts). It distinguishes object from class, instead of cladism’s inconsistent distinction of finite class from infinite class and object. The cladistic distinction may appear “natural” to cladists, but it is none the less both inconsistent and empirically wrong.

Truth is a relative conclusion.

→ Leave a CommentCategories: Biological systematics (generic) · Cladism

On the consequences of the incongruence between properties

October 22, 2009 · Leave a Comment

The fact that every object possesses at least two properties means that properties are not ordered either in time or over time, or in time and over time, meaning that they in a phylogeny (i.e., a dichotomously branching process) are not necessarily congruent. On the contrary, they can only be congruent for a totally symmetrical phylogeny.

The fact that clade is a class, and thus basically a property, means that such objects can be consistently distinguished only  in totally symmetrical phylogenies, leaving out phylogenies resulting in an odd number of objects, since they can’t be totally symmetrical.

Cladism (i.e., only acknowledging clades) does thus restrict the space of possible phylogenies for the objects of a particular kind dramatically into only the totally symmetrical ones. It only acknowledges totally symmetrical phylogenies.

What cladism does with phylogenies that are not totally symmetrical is written in the sand, since cladism assumes that all phylogenies are totally symmetrical. Cladism is not equipped to deal with reality, but only to its dream. It does not acknowledge reality, but only its dream.

The incongruence between properties does thus falsify cladism, a falsification that cladism turns up-side-down into a falsification of the incongruence between properties by cladism. Cladism simply defines that properties  are congruent instead of accepting that they are incongruent. It is a way of solving problems by denying that they are problems, by denying that there are any problems what-so-ever. Properties are simply defined to be congruent although they are incongruent. It is constructivity to the degree of denying facts. It is science breaking its way into belief, claiming that science is belief.

This is, however, wrong. Science can never compete with belief, since they play on different arenas: science testing practical models, and belief claiming that it is otherwise than it appears to be. Science explains what we experience with what we experience, whereas belief explains what we see with what we cannot experience. If they meet, science wins. Belief can only win in statements that are untestable.

The fact that properties are incongruent does thus mean that cladism’s erroneous assumption that they are congruent turns cladism into a (erroneous) belief. It’s close association to science appears to make it an interest of science, but it is the other way around. It is actually an attack on science which science ought to fight, since turning biological systematics into cladism turns biological systematics into a belief like all other beliefs. Classifying biological organisms is not a matter of revealing a “natural” classification, but of agreeing on a classification that agrees with our notion of “natural” groups.

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A test of the inclination towards cladism

October 21, 2009 · Leave a Comment

A test of the inclination towards cladism (i.e., lack of formal thinking) and an explanation of this inclination can be found at http://www.scribd.com/doc/95753/A-Short-Test-for-Formal-Operations-Thinking.

It is neither forbidden nor punishable to lack ability to see one’s own glasses (i.e., to lack ability to view one’s own seeing from an abstract outside position), but it has to be put under supervision of those have the ability, because it is an inclination towards fanatism. The question is not “how to cure a fanatic ?”, as Amos Oz posed it, but instead “how to control the inclination to fall into fanatism?”. Fanatism can’t be cured, but can only prevented. It is opened by a single person that triggers the inclination of many to fall into it.

The trigger of cladism was Willi Hennig and its catalysts Steve Farris and Gareth Nelson. None of the presently convinced cladists can thus be cured, but presumptive new cladists can only be prevented from entering it. There is no cure for fanatics, but only a resistence among non-fanatics from entering fanatism that has to be taken care of and being enforced. The well of fanatism is easy to fall into, but difficult to climb out of. Those that have fallen into it usually never get out of it, but we can hinder our children from falling into it. The best prevention is to force our children to view reality from several different aspects. It can immunize them from falling into cladism.

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On the ambiguity of classification, lumping and splitting, and cladism

October 16, 2009 · Leave a Comment

Reality can be classified both across and along. The fact that these two dimensions leave no middle, that is, not place for all single classes, means that classification is ambiguous per definition.

This ambiguity is thus a fact that can only be either acknowledged or denied. Denial does not change it, but only pulls the mat over it. The mat in cladism is phylogeny reconstruction, hiding it in the classification of data (i.e., the coding of characters and character states). The truth is that there  are several different ways to classify a single set of data points, which is also empirically evidenced by the history of biological classification and the endless battles between lumpers and splitters in the Linnean system.

This ambiguity does thus not disappear just because lumpers and splitters decide to join in cladism, but only changes its position from the classification of organisms (i.e., of objects) to the classification of their properties, where it is hidden by confusion of  properties with objects in the “objects” biological species. Their joining just opens for them to continue their eternal battles (i.e., chase for the carrot(s) they call “a natural classification”, which hang(s) in front of all their noses) on two fronts: coding of properties into characters and character states, and reconstruction of phylogeny, and also for a joint battle against empirical science by inconsistent reasonings wherein the conclusions always contradict their assumptions.

The joining of lumpers and splitters in cladsism does thus open for a new “scientific discipline” based on the axiom that classes exist, and consisting of claims and denials, wherein every claim can be denied and vice versa. Its decisive criterion (analogous to science’s empirical falsification) is simplicity. It accepts every claim and denial that is simpler than another claim and denial is in an eternal merry-go-round that their ambiguous axiom provides.

Cladism is thus applied lumping and splitting. When such a phenomenon emerges within a scientific discipline, it opens a possibility for a single person to enter an endless occupation of lumping and splitting the same set of data points (i.e., organisms) obscuring its lack of end by a never-ending inconsistent reasoning, as a well-paid university career. This possibility can only be closed by disambiguating the definitional circularity that opens it, that is, the definition of monophyletic as both holo- and monophyletic (also called clade) (and corollary “denial” of paraphyletic).   

The worst problem with cladism (i.e., the common confusion of properties and objects, or of kind and thing) is that it adds a generic inconsistency (i.e., ambiguity) to the fundamental ambiguity of classification, thereby also introducing an incompatibility with facts. It means that cladism is not only ambiguous, bot also empirically wrong. Cladism thus leads our minds into a position that is both inconsistent and empirically wrong, but from where it is difficult to escape. There are actually only two ways out of it:

1. The same way as the history proceeded from Parmenides’ comprehension (i.e., thesis), via Heracleitos’ antithesis and Aristotle’s synthesis to the Linnean system, or

2, the same way as that by which it was entered, that is, by rejecting its denial of the fundamental fact that classification is ambiguous, or, turned up-side-down, by acknowledging that classification is ambiguous.

Classification’s fundamental ambiguity does not disappear independently of whether one (or we) takes the position of Parmenides or Linné or travel along the two routes between them (backwards from the Linné to cladism (=Parmenides), or forwards from Parmenides to science (=Linné)). It (the ambiguity) remains independently of whether classification is framed in the context of objects (Linné) or of properties (Parmenides). The former is, however, consistent, whereas the latter is both inconsistent and empirically wrong.

Classification is fundamentally ambiguous. This fact cannot be changed by any distinction of a class, like the class clade, but can only be hidden under the mat in a room that’s filled with smoke. It can only be made as difficult as possible to be found.

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Cladism – a pie in the sky

October 14, 2009 · Leave a Comment

Typologists (like cladists) seek the final classification, since it would halt their wandering thoughts (or evolving thoughts as John Wilkins so aptly called it).  Such a final classification is, however, non-existing, showed by the fact that almost everything can be turned up-side-down.

Cladism’s solution to acknowledge the turning up-side-down itself as a class (i.e., clades) does not change this fact just because this class can’t be turned up-side-down, because the class is empty. “Turning up-side-downs” (i.e., clades) is nothing but a hallucination in the absence of something to turn up-side-down. On it’s own, it is like a sailboat with locked sails – winds are changing, but its response to all of them is the same. To it, the important issue is not the course (or the goal), but the setting of the sails itself. The goal is instead the place the boat drifts to. It means that the boat will be drifting on the boundless ocean of concepts forever and anywhere, without any possibility to close up on any position (“evolving thoughts” as John Wilkins so aptly called it).

Some cladists (notably Kevin de Quieroz) have tried to catch the “evolving thoughts” with definitions (of clades) that catch the “evolving thought” that is presently occupying a certain position by defining positions instead of classes in a system called the PhyloCode. Unfortunately, these definitions are internally incompatible, meaning that the system (i.e., the Phylocode) is a practical impossibility. 

This fact can, however, never penetrate into (these) cladists’ minds, since they are lost  in a conceptual reality that lacks the notion of incompatibility totally by acknowledging it. To them, incompatibility is not a problem, but a virtue, or an axiom; their problem is instead compatibility. They thus cannot understand the importance of impossibility for one’s actions, because they acknowledge it. Their goal is actually the impossible, ”denying” everything that is possible as not being “natural”. They believe that their impossibility (incompatibility) can be found. They think that their goal (i.e., a final classification) is so close that they can claim that it has theoretically been reached, and thus that only the practical application remains to be reached. As a cladist expressed it: “it is very nearly correct”.

The worst problem for cladism is one that cladists have been unable to discover in their battle to fulfill their dream: that time is relative. The reason that they haven’t discovered this obstacle for the fulfillment of their dream is that it requires a skeptical mind (i.e., a falsificationist) instead of the verificationist (cladist) mind. The problem is that typology equalizes space with time, thus excluding any possibility for time tro be relative to space, which the fact that time is relative falsifies. This fact does thus falsify typologists’ dream, that is, a final classification. It simply evidences that this dream is both theoretically and practically impossible.

 This fact does thus not leave any other option to cladists than to crawl to the cross admitting that they are wrong. They can try to flee to the corners of the ring, but their battle is lost. Sooner or later their opponent will catch them and knock them. They cannot escape the fact that their goal is non-existent (like the treasure at the foot of the rainbow).  Their shared idea is thus a pie in the sky.

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If kinds exist … (i.e., cladism)

October 13, 2009 · Leave a Comment

If kinds exist, as cladism assumes as an axiom, then two kinds in a row can be one kind, whereof all three (i.e., the first, the second and the third (i.e., both of them together)) exist as one kind. 

This sounds OK to a cladist. If, however, the first of these three kinds is different from the second, then all three of them cannot exist (or have existed), since the first is not identical to the second, and the third thus not identical to itself. This is concretized by assuming that the first have scales and the second not have scales, meaning that the third both have scales and not have scales. These three kinds cannot exist or have existed, since the first and the second occupy the positions of have existed and exist, leaving the third out of the possibilities of existing. There aren’t three kinds of existence.

It means that if cladism’s axiom that kinds exist is correct, then there are kinds that do not exist. This conclusion is also OK for cladists, since they claim that the kind of kinds that do not exist are paraphyletic group, that is, the first. This comprehension is, however, wrong. The kind that does not exist is the third, that is, both of them (i.e., clade). If it would have been the first (i.e., paraphyletic group), then the third (i.e., clade) would have been ambiguous between existing and not existing. It means that the assumption that kinds exist is ambiguous between  three kinds of two kinds, whereof cladism’s comprehension that it is the first (i.e., paraphyletic group) that does not exist makes the third (i.e., clade) ambiguous. 

In summary: the assumption that kinds exist is ambiguous between two kinds making up three kinds (i.e., two kinds in a row and both of these), whereof cladism’s comprehension that it is the first kind (i.e., paraphyletic group) that does not exist makes the third (i.e., clade) ambiguous in existence. Cladism’s own comprehension does thus make its own comprehension ambiguous in existence. It so-to-speak creates its own problems. 

This problem is easily solved by assuming as an axiom that objects, instead of kinds, exist. This axiom does not lead into a return alley, like cladism does, but into science. Cladists must have been sleeping on the science classes in school. However, what weren’t possible to teach them then is probably neither possible to teach them now, meaning that science has to fight them down. Their paranoic confusion has to be disclosed in order to save science. The only alternative is to allow their paranoic confusion to take over biological systematics, which is already almost completed with Steve Farris and Gareth Nelson at the rudder. Biological systematics is going down.

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