On aspects, cladism, populationism and Mikael Härlin

All discussion about reality is a matter of aspects, and ultimately of aspect itself. The fact that aspect includes an observer and something observed means that the observed is both concrete and abstract at the same time: concrete in the observed and abstract in the observer.  The observed does thereby both exist and not exist at the same time: exists in the concrete but does not exist in the abstract.

This ambiguous truth (i.e. fact) is consistently incorporated in scientific conceptualization using generics, specifics and specific differences (like the Linnean system): generics representing the abstract, specifics representing the concrete, and specific differences representing specific differences in generic similarities.

The concept clade confuses scientific conceptualization by confusing specifics with generic by confusing specific differences with their generic similarities, and is thereby, in practice, deconceptualization of scientific conceptualization. It undoes what scientific conceptualization does. In terms of aspects, however, it rests on the inconsistent (and empirically erroneous) assumption that all aspects are (is) one and the same aspect. They are (is) not! It is actually the other way around: all aspects on one and the same object is on one and the same object. The aspect on the back side of an object is not the same aspect as the aspect on the front side of it in any respects.  The concept clade does thus rest on an inconsistent and empirically erroneous assumption. It means that accepting (and using) the concept clade leads into an up-side-down comprehension of both observer and the observed, and aspect. It simply twists the relation between the concrete and the abstract up-side-down, with all corollary consequences. This is the explanation of Malte Ebach’s stupidities. He’s simply lost in a mess of aspects, denying all but his own: that there is only one aspect: his own. He simply “denies” different aspects, actually difference itself. He does not put his energy into observing, but into denying those that do.

The problem for populationists like cladists is that they have different aspects on their own belief, although all of them claim that there is only one aspect on it. This difference sooner or later tears populationistic beliefs like cladism apart. Populationism (i.e., oversimplification) like cladism has a tendency to rise like a sun but fall like a pancake. Cladism presentlyappears to be falling like a pancake. 

What did Mikael Härlin, Gareth Nelson, Steve Farris, Kevin de Quieroz, Jim Carpenter and other cladists actually say?  Did anyone understand statements like Mikael Härlins “if we lose the names, also the knowledge of objects we lose”.  In a neutral form, this statement is expressed as “the names of objects are crucial, if we lose them, then we also lose the knowledge about objects”. Which, of course, isn’t true. Names are not crucial to knowledge of objects. We can easily change names and content of names without losing any knowledge about them. Mikael’s worry rests on his cladistic belief that objects are abstract.  Don’t be worried, Mikael, objects (like you and me) are concrete. We exist. Knowledge about us does not dependent on our names, but only on our beings. Only if you only discuss the abstract, do you have reason to worry about names, and since the abstract is only a representation of the concrete, you avoid these problems by discussing the concrete (that is, what you see, or you and me).

Doing so is, however, impossible for a cladist, since it would lead him back to reality, thus contradicting cladism. A cladist is caught on the wrong side of the concrete and the abstract without any possibilities to pass to the right side without giving up cladism. They do what they can to confuse concepts for the rest of us.