On the problems with cladistics (i.e., cladism)

Biological systematics took a radical turn in the late 1960-ies, starting to abandon the Linnean classification for a new kind of classification proposed by the German entomologist Willi Hennig. today called cladistics, or cladism. The classification was coupled to a method for analyzing the evolutionary relationships between biological species, classifying the result(s) of the analysis instead of the existing species.  The classification obviously led to a load of paradoxes, i.e., was inconsistent, but was argued for anyway by the arguments that it is “natural”, and that it is consistent on the basis of its premises. Opponents agreed that it is consistent on the basis of its premises, but argued that its premises are wrong. Proving that premises (i.e., axioms) of an approach are wrong, is, however, difficult, since approaches are defined by their axioms.   

Most biological systematists thus understand that cladism is inconsistent, but “believe” that the incinsistency doesn’t matter. They believe that cladism agrees with reality (i.e., is “natural”), although being inconsistent. The problem with this belief is, however, that cladism cannot be compared with reality, because its inconsistency resides in confusing the concepts ‘thing’ and ‘kind’, and kinds do not exist. An illustration of a dichotomously branching process (i.e., a phylogenetic tree) does of course agree with that specific process, but it does not mean that it agrees with a phylogeny of a kind of things, just as no single thing is a kind of things. Kinds simply do not exist, but are our inventions. Instead, the belief that a phylogenetic tree can agree with the phylogeny of a kind of things implicitly assumes that time equalizes space, which the fact that time is relative proves to be wrong. The belief that cladism’s inconsistency doesn’t matter does thus compose a bridge between objectivity (i.e.. the assumption that things exist) and subjectivity (i.e., the belief that kinds exist); that is, a bridge from science to anti-science, whereof the position on the other side, i.e., subjectivity or anti-science, is falsified by facts.

The problem with passing this bridge is that it catches one in a comprehension that thing equals kind, and thus that kind equals thing. Taken in this order, thing and kind are confused instead of being distinguished. In this order, the two concepts form a perfect paranoia. The belief that the inconsistency doesn’t matter does thus lead into this paranoia. The problem with the paranoia, in turn, is that it (similar to other paranoias) is totally wrong. Things simply do not equal kinds. It means that (1) it is impossible to find a consistent definition of the things it discerns (i.e., clades) per definition, and (2) that the approach, as well as its derivations, will continue to diverge into different varieties indefinitely by this impossibility. Passing the bridge does thus lead into ever branching kinds of true Sisofys’ works. As such, it is the perfect research approach; it cannot reach an end, but will instead continue to open new branches indefinately per definition. It can only reach an end by being abandoned.

Cladism was argued for mainly because it appeared to compose an unambiguous classification of phylogenies, since the traditional Linnean classification offers an ambiguity (i.e., several different classifications of one and the same phylogenetic tree) by its acceptance of paraphyletic groups. Also this belief is, however, wrong. Cladism is just as ambiguous as the Linnean classification is, and also for the same reason, it only hides this ambiguity in its “coding” of properties into characters and character states, that is, in the actual classification. Here, it means that (1) there are several different “codings” possible for each phylogenetic tree, and that (2) no single ”coding” can be found at all per definition, because (1) phylogenetic trees contain paraphyletic groups and (2) kinds cannot exist per definition. Hennig did not understand these facts (or pretended not to), but instead got rid of paraphyletic groups by “denying” them. When the falsification of his inconsistent approach stared him in his eyes, he said away, away…

Cladism is thus an inconsistent (that is, self-contradictory), empirically erroneous and ambiguous classification of phylogenies, whereas a classification of the Linnean kind (i.e., categories of categories) is a correct and ambiguous classification of phylogenies. Both are thus ambiguous, and this ambuguity is actually an ambiguity we cannot get rid of, since it is the (real) ambiguity between stasis and change. The consistent (i.e., scientific) conceptualization of phylogenies is thus a system of the Linnean kind, that is, as categories of categories. This is thus not a claim, but merely a statement of a fact (explained above). See also Biol J Linn Soc, Envall M, 2008. “On the difference between mono-. holo- and paraphyletic groups: a consistent distinction of process and pattern” 94:217-220.