On aspects, cladism, populationism and Mikael Härlin

All discussion about reality is a matter of aspects, and ultimately of aspect itself. The fact that aspect includes an observer and something observed means that the observed is both concrete and abstract at the same time: concrete in the observed and abstract in the observer.  The observed does thereby both exist and not exist at the same time: exists in the concrete but does not exist in the abstract.

This ambiguous truth (i.e. fact) is consistently incorporated in scientific conceptualization using generics, specifics and specific differences (like the Linnean system): generics representing the abstract, specifics representing the concrete, and specific differences representing specific differences in generic similarities.

The concept clade confuses scientific conceptualization by confusing specifics with generic by confusing specific differences with their generic similarities, and is thereby, in practice, deconceptualization of scientific conceptualization. It undoes what scientific conceptualization does. In terms of aspects, however, it rests on the inconsistent (and empirically erroneous) assumption that all aspects are (is) one and the same aspect. They are (is) not! It is actually the other way around: all aspects on one and the same object is on one and the same object. The aspect on the back side of an object is not the same aspect as the aspect on the front side of it in any respects.  The concept clade does thus rest on an inconsistent and empirically erroneous assumption. It means that accepting (and using) the concept clade leads into an up-side-down comprehension of both observer and the observed, and aspect. It simply twists the relation between the concrete and the abstract up-side-down, with all corollary consequences. This is the explanation of Malte Ebach’s stupidities. He’s simply lost in a mess of aspects, denying all but his own: that there is only one aspect: his own. He simply “denies” different aspects, actually difference itself. He does not put his energy into observing, but into denying those that do.

The problem for populationists like cladists is that they have different aspects on their own belief, although all of them claim that there is only one aspect on it. This difference sooner or later tears populationistic beliefs like cladism apart. Populationism (i.e., oversimplification) like cladism has a tendency to rise like a sun but fall like a pancake. Cladism presentlyappears to be falling like a pancake. 

What did Mikael Härlin, Gareth Nelson, Steve Farris, Kevin de Quieroz, Jim Carpenter and other cladists actually say?  Did anyone understand statements like Mikael Härlins “if we lose the names, also the knowledge of objects we lose”.  In a neutral form, this statement is expressed as “the names of objects are crucial, if we lose them, then we also lose the knowledge about objects”. Which, of course, isn’t true. Names are not crucial to knowledge of objects. We can easily change names and content of names without losing any knowledge about them. Mikael’s worry rests on his cladistic belief that objects are abstract.  Don’t be worried, Mikael, objects (like you and me) are concrete. We exist. Knowledge about us does not dependent on our names, but only on our beings. Only if you only discuss the abstract, do you have reason to worry about names, and since the abstract is only a representation of the concrete, you avoid these problems by discussing the concrete (that is, what you see, or you and me).

Doing so is, however, impossible for a cladist, since it would lead him back to reality, thus contradicting cladism. A cladist is caught on the wrong side of the concrete and the abstract without any possibilities to pass to the right side without giving up cladism. They do what they can to confuse concepts for the rest of us.

On the difference between the cladistic classification (i.e., cladification) and a scientific classification (e.g. the Linnean system)

The difference between the cladistic classification (i.e., cladification) and a scientific classification (e.g. the Linnean system) is first and foremost that adherents of cladification (i.e., cladists) do not consider cladification to be a classification at all, but do instead comprehend clades as “natural groups” (instead of a class of objects).

The reason for this difference is that cladists have adopted the axiom that kinds exist (instead of that objects exist) to turn a misconception of an inconsistency in Darwin’s illustration of the origin of species consistent. The problem they try to solve is that Darwin’s illustration of a dichotomously branching origin of a kind (i.e., biological species) is inconsistent if the internal lines (i.e., the lines between the nodes) are interpreted as single things, since it makes them both descendants and ancestors at the same time, whereas the first and the last lines only are an ancestor respectively descendants (at the same time). This problem is consistently solved by interpreting the internal lines as two objects in a row (i.e., a descendant and an ancestor), but cladists do instead solve it by inconsistently interpreting also them as single objects, thus confusing object with kind (over time). Cladists thus confuse object with kind in an attempt to disambiguate an ambiguity in Darwin’s model. The correct disambiguation of this ambiguity is thus to interpret the internal lines as two objects in a row.

Cladification is theoretically possible, since finite classes are possible, but the practical problem with it is that classification of reality is ambiguous, although cladification gives the impression that it isn’t by hiding this ambiguity under the mat (by pretending that we can observe a dichotomous origin of a class, and in the coding of characters and character states), and that it thus heightens a practically vain search to define the indefinable. What it actually tries to find is a definition of definition of definition. Definition can be (and has been) defined, but not definition of definition. The reason that definition of definition can’t be defined is that it is a singularity, and that singularities can’t be defined.

A scientific classification, like the Linnean system, starts with objects and defines them as classes, then consider these classes as objects and defines them as classes, and so on.  It traverses the conceptual multidimensional space (most importantly even and odd levels) consistently by keeping concepts consistently apart on every level. Cladists react against that the classification is ambiguous in accepting “paraphyletic groups”, but this is only a necessary consession to the ambiguity that resides in that every classification is a simplification. This ambiguity also applies on cladification, with the only difference that it here is hidden under the mat pretending that it doesn’t exist.  

The difference between cladism’s classification (i.e., cladification) and a scientific classification (e.g. the Linnean system) is thus first and foremost that cladification hides an unavoidable classificatory ambiguity under the mat, whereas a scientific classification acknowledges and incorporates it. In practice, it means that cladification is impossible. This fact may be understood right now, or awaiting understanding for hundreds, thousands or millions of years. The donkey may stop chasing the carrot today, or continue chasing it forever. It is we that choose which, because we are (is) the donkey.

“Tappar vi namnen bort, även kunskapen om tingen vi mister” (Mikael Härlin)

Docent Mikael Härlin på Södertörns högskola har myntat det obegripliga påståendet att: ”tappar vi namnen bort, även kunskapen om tingen vi mister”. 

“Kunskapen om tingen” är inte knuten till namnen på tingen på något enda sätt. Vi kan lätt byta namn på vilka ting och vilka kategorier av ting som helst, inklusive oss själva, utan att därför “mista kunskapen” om dessa ting. Mikael Härlin bytte själv sitt namn från Svensson till Härlin för några år sedan, och ingen som känner honom har därför “mist någon kunskap” om honom.

Påståendet är vackert, men totalt felaktigt. Det spelar dock inte  någon roll för honom själv, eftersom han anser (vilket han har anförtrott mig) att det är viktigare att ett påstående är vackert än att det är korrekt (det har jag på mail). Detta bör forskare beakta när de läser hans skrifter. Hans strävan ligger mer åt det vackra än åt det korrekta.

On classification and cladism

The major problem to understand classification (conceptualization) is that it is three-dimensional. Two of the dimensions are due to that there are classes of classes, and the third is that classification “hangs” between reality and abstraction. 

The first two dimensions mean that classification is inherently ambiguous (i.e., that the concept class includes two incompatible classes), which are traditionally distinguished as class and category. The difference between them is just that a single of each contains at least two of the other (i.e., that their relation can be described by the formula X/Y=Y/X).  

The third dimension is more difficult to understand. The fact that it has “one foot” in reality and “one foot” in abstraction means that it is abstract from a reality’s pont of view, real from an abstract’s point of view, and both abstract and real from an objective point of view. This relation can, however, also be regarded as an ambiguity, here between reality and abstraction, where both (i.e., objectivity) corresponds to either class or category, reality corresponds to either two classes or two categories, and abstract corresponds to either two classes or categories (if reality corresponds to two classes, then the abstract corresponds to two categories, and vice versa).

The first two dimensions are thus orthogonal (i.e., diametrical) to each other, and the third dimension is orthogonal to the first two. This nested orthogonality is actually typical for members of the concept  dimension. Dimensions are orthogonal in order.

This ordered (nested) orthogonality is the most difficult in classification to understand. In principle, it means that dimensions are compatible between every other level, but (totally) incompatible between adjacent levels. Assumption on one level is deduction on an adjacent level, and vice versa. Logic merely traverses the ordered (nested) orthogonality of classification consistently (that is, every other level to where it started from). It can be analogized with only using even or odd numbered dimension numbers.

The starting point for logic reasoning is decided by its fundamental axiom. This offers two choices: that objects exist or that classes exist. Starting from the axiom that objects exist means that it enters classification in one dimension, that is, in classification itself, wheras starting from the axiom that classes exist means that it enters classification with classes, and thus that it ends up one dimensional level out of order. It means that starting with the axiom that classes exist leads into a logical reasoning where every concept has the opposite meaning as in a correct entering into logical reasoning.  The entering into logical reasoning is thus crucial in that it has to get object and class right. Calling object class and class object merely turns the meanings of concepts up-side-down. The reasoning is the same; it is only dressed in contrary concepts.

These properties of classification means that an unambiguous classification of reality is impossible per definition. The orthogonality between the even and odd numbered dimensions cannot be traversed. This fact is acknowledged by the Linnean classification, but not by the Hennigian cladification. The difference between them is thus that the Linnean classification does not try to find a classification that cannot be found, which the Hennigian cladification does. Hennigian cladification thus tries to catch the carrot in front of the donkey’s eyes.

Cladism’s denial of science

If we assume as an axiom that kinds exist (as cladism does), then it is actually possible to deny the traditional hypotetico-deductive scientific method using its own method. Cladism’s axiom means that two consecutive kinds have to equal a single kind (to make present possible), which falsifies the traditional hypotetico-deductive science’s axiom that a single kind is a single kind, instead accepting cladism’s hypothesis that consecutive kinds are single kinds. Traditional hypotetico-deductive science’s falsification does thus deny itself.

This falsification does, of course, not mean that the traditional hypotetico-deductive science is wrong, but that it is wrong given cladism’s axiom that kinds exist is right. Any hypothesis or axiom is ultimately judged by its agreement with facts, and cladism’s axiom that kinds exist does not agree with the fact that time is relative.  It means that although cladism could have falsified traditional science using its own method, it can’t. It is, as usual, very close to, but cannot, as usual, reach the carrot.

Biological systematics: organisms being placed into a rigid ranked hierarchy of taxa or not being “slotted” into a rank in an overall hierarchy of taxa?

In today’s cladist discussions one often meet the argument that:

“Linnaean taxonomy demands that all organisms be placed neatly into a rigid, ranked, hierarchy of taxa, such that one individual kind of organism must belong in one of each of the categories: species, genus, family, order, class, phylum and kingdom, whereas since clades can be nested at any level, they do not have to be neatly slotted into a rank in an overall hierarchy”. 

The argument is ambiguous by discussing two different kinds of things: organisms and clades. What an organism is, is not in doubt, but what a clade is, is in doubt. Clade does actually include the groups we call paraphyletic groups, although cladists “deny” that they do. The problem with clades (i.e., clade) is thus not whether they “have to be neatly slotted into a rank” , but that the concept is ambiguous. If it hadn’t been, we would have organized organisms into clades long ago. The problem is that any classification of reality (also cladification) “slots” reality. And the problem with cladification is that it “slots” reality inconsistently and empirically erroneously, which the Linnean system doesn’t. Cladists make the discussion appear as if we have the choice of “slotting” reality or not “slotting” reality, when we just have the choice of “slotting” reality consistently or inconsistently. In this choice, the Linnean system is a consistent “slotting”, whereas cladism is an inconsistent (and empirically erroneous) “slotting”.

I guess the fundamental problem for biological systematics is that there isn’t an unambiguous “slotting” to be found at all per definition, since every concept contains at least two contrary concepts per definition. There thus isn’t any final biological systematization (i.e., “slotting”) to be found per definition, independently of whether it uses the consistent Linnean system or the inconsistent cladification. This is a tough fact to face for any scientific branch. A definitional lack of end turns it into a matter of reaching consensus, which pheneticists tried, but evoke the contrary. Seeking and reaching consensus is not the hallmark of biological systematics.

Cladism (cladistics) is the opposite to science

Cladism (cladistics) is the opposite to science, that is, consistently wrong. It is an expression of biological systematics’ erroneous assumption that kinds exist, being applied as an axiom, which have screwed  bunch of biological systematists to turning the whole thing (i.e., our discussion about reality) up-side-down and in-side-out. In this position they think they have found a new paradigm; they just can’t agree about which. They are standing in the midst of nowhere, jointly taking stand against phenetics and mutually taking stand against each other, without any possibility of finding a balanced position by their denial of such a thing (see Paraphyly watch on Malte Ebach’s blog). They’re experiencing the destiny of fundamentalists: split by oppressing or getting oppressed. For or against,  black or white. 

Before cladism, biological systematics was about for or against certain classifications, but after cladism it is about for or against cladism, that is, against or for science: cladism generically representing a choice between black and white (denying the gray scale), and science representing the moderate acceptance of the gray scale (with the abstract endpoints black and white). Cladism turned biological systematics from a scientific classification war into an ideological war: for or against cladism (and thus against or for science), There is no neutral point between the two.

I choose science. What do you choose?

Systematics fundamentalism, or cladism

Systematics (classification, or conceptualization) is traditionally a tool science uses to discuss reality. Its construction, using classes of classes, or concepts of concepts, means that it lacks an unambiguous single solution, since all single classes (or concepts) are two classes (or concepts) at the same time per definition, and that any single object thus is a member of at least two incongruent classes at the same time per definition. 

Now, there are people that don’t understand the basis for systematization, i.e., classification, or conceptualization, but instead believe that there is a single unambiguous classification to be found. Contrary to scientists, they believe that reality is made up of classes of objects, instead of understanding that it is us that classify reality. They believe that classes actually exist in reality, instead of objects. They commonly don’t understand that both classes and objects can’t exist at the same time, but, on the contrary, assume that they not only can, but do. The explanation for this inconsistent approach is that these people think that they don’t classify anything, but only accept a “natural” contradiction. They think that systematization is a matter of accepting a “natural” contradiction. Their problem is thus to explain away the internal (”natural”) contradiction of their approach. This problem is, however, impossible to solve, since this “natural” contradiction is a definitional contradiction. It is simply their own contradiction in classifying reality. They can’t escape their own contradiction.

Their belief that classes exist may be called systematics fundamentalism, but is already called cladism. It is a belief that classification itself may be a science. The worst problem with this belief is that its acceptance of it in practice denies the approach that denies inconsistency, that is, science. Accepting it as a science does thus require a denial of science. It is thus not only inconsistent, but also requires denial of consistency.

The strongest proponent of this fundamentalism presently is Malte Ebach. He has even installed a watch on his blog against science in biological systematics that he calls “paraphyly watch”, and in which he attacks all scientific approaches to biological problems. He aggressively attacks  science just like Gareth Nelson, Steve Farris and Jim Carpenter did before him. They all participate in cladism’s war against science that John Wilkins called the class war. The systematics fundamentalists within biological systematics have thus come to the conclusion that it is time to confront science. Unfortunately, a single cladist mind does not agree with itself. Its ghost resides in itself as what it calls phentics, not realizing that its actual enemy is science. Cladism’s ”class war” is a triple battle between two specifics and their generic, whereof none can be denied. There is thus nothing in this war that cladism can deny. The war is a war inside of classification; it is impossible to deny a part of classification.

“The Root of all Evil Blunders in systematics” (Malte Ebach)

Malte Ebach does in his Paraphyly Watch 3: Transitional Fossils, Miccrobes & Patrocladistics claim that Ashlock (1971) is the ”Root of all Evil Blunders in systematics”. It means that Malte deems “systematics” ( presumably biological systematics) before Hennig to be “Root of all Evil Blunders in systematics”. He discards the development of conceptualization and biological systematics for about 2,500 years to be the “Root of all Evil Blunders in systematics” . He returns to Parmenides’ inconsistent approach, calling Aristotle’s consistent synthesis of Parmenides’ and Heracleitos’ approaches and the following scientific advances reaching its height in the Linnean system the “Root of all Evil Blunders in systematics”. He’s not only against science as an approach, but moreover calls it the “Root of all Evil Blunders in systematics”.

It comes close for a non-cladist to call Malte Ebach the “Root of all Evil Blunders in systematics”, but I won’t. I just put myself in a questioning pose against Malte Ebach. Is this man sane? Does he talk about the living organisms we all see in front of our eyes or has he left reality? Does he consider a humpback whale to be a humpback whale, and a whale to be a whale? Or, does he claim that a humpback whale is not a humpback whale or that a whale is not a whale?

Does Malte Ebach know what every object is?  Is Malte Ebach God? Does he have the (impossible) ultimate key? Is Malte Ebach larger than Linn’e, Aristotle and Einstein? Will Malte Ebach go into the historical record as the person that uncovered science’s ambiguity and led biological systematics to unambiguity? Is Malte Ebach both the key and the ultimate understanding at the same time? Is Malte Ebach worth worshiping? Or, does he need treatment? 

Ashlock, P.D. (1971). Monophyly and associated terms. Systematic Zoology 20:63-69.

How cladism solved the problem that reality is distinct from abstraction

The fact that reality is distinct from our abstractions of it (i.e., our models of reality) means that an unambiguous classification of reality is impossible. The reason is that classification has to catch both process and pattern, and that these two phenomena are orthogonal (i.e., diametrical). There is thus no way of catching reality in an unambiguous classification.

Now, cladism solved this “problem”  by claiming that an unambiguous classification of reality on the contrary is possible (using the class clade), and denying the fact that it isn’t. It thus solved an insolvable “problem” (i.e., got rid of a fact) by claiming that the opposite is a fact and denying that it is a fact. It thus “claimed away” the fact and, to ultimately bury it, also denied it.

This solution is analogous to claiming that the speed of light is relative, and denying that time is relative. It turns an orthogonal relation up-side-down. In this case, however, it is empirically wrong (i.e., falsified by facts). The speed of light is not relative, but absolute, and time is relative. Cladism is thus wrong (i.e., falsified by facts). An unambiguous classification of reality is not possible. It doesn’t matter  how much we try, an unambiguous classification of reality is not possible per definition. 

Cladism’s solution of this unsolvable problem has led lots of people into the insensible position that is traditionally called subjectivity. It means that they believe they talk about the same phenomenon (-a), although they will never reach a consensus about what it is.  They acknowledge the same word (i.e., clade), but will never reach consensus about clades, for the simple reason that clade is an  inconsistent concept and that there thus are several different, incompatible clades. Clade is a subjective and not objective concept. It is different for different people.

Cladism thus solved the problem that reality is distinct from abstraction by claiming that abstraction is the same as reality, and denying that reality is distinct from abstraction. Although this solved the problem for cladists, it didn’t for others. Reality still appears to be as distinct from abstraction as it always have been, despite cladism’s double denial of this distinction. Only the heads of cladists appears to have been screwed, to the extent that they weren’t from from the beginning. Now, they’re trying to force biological systematics into the screwed Wonderland they inhabit.

If there is one thing I regret in my life, then it is taking a PhD in biological systematics. I didn’t realize that biological systematists are the most hostile people to natural science among all natural sciences. A majority of them appears to hate Karl Popper. My aim was not to enter a war with believers, but to understand evolution. My present aim is, however, to kick cladism out of the realm of science. I’m not against cladism, but against calling it science. It is actually the least science of all possible approaches to reality, including all religions. It is the most possible erroneous approach. It is as wrong as anything possibly can be. It is wrong-wrong.  I am prepared to discuss cladism with any cladist (like Steve Farris, Gareth Nelson, Mark Siddall, Per Sundberg, Mikael Härlin, Kevin deQuieroz, Jim Carpenter, and the latest stars Malte Ebach and Gareth Nelson’s disciple John Wilkins) anytime, but they do not dare to discuss it with me, because they know that I’m right. Cladism is a difficult conceptual confusion to get rid of, but I try to the best I can.